The Fight for Civilian Government
The Fight for Civilian Government
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter discusses the support for civilian government for Guam and all Pacific islands. In an address before the Hawaiian Legislature on February 28, 1947, Interior Secretary Julius A. Krug said that “the native populations of Guam and American Samoa have made great progress under naval administration. But now they are ready for the next step in the American tradition, which is civil political administration, responsible to the people who are governed.” Back in Washington, on March 7, he testified before the House Public Lands Committee, saying that he was “very certain” that a greater degree of self-rule for the Pacific islands was desirable. On this same day the proposed trusteeship agreement covering most of the islands of Micronesia was put before the Security Council, where the United States could exercise a veto, instead of the General Assembly, where issues would be decided by majority vote. On March 24, 1947, Representative Norris Poulson (R., Calif.) introduced H.R. 2753, proposing U.S. citizenship and an organic act for the people of Guam. On April 9, an identical bill, S. 1078, was introduced by Hugh A. Butler (R., Nebr.) in the Senate.
Stopping in Hawai‘i on his way home from Shanghai, American Samoa, Kwajalein, Guam, Wake, and Japan, Interior Secretary Krug left no doubt about his personal conviction that increased self-government and civilian administration were best for the Pacific islands. In an address before the Hawaiian Legislature on February 28, 1947, he strongly supported statehood for Hawai‘i, then added: “the native populations of Guam and American Samoa have made great progress under naval administration. But now they are ready for the next step in the American tradition, which is civil political administration, responsible to the people who are governed.”1
Back in Washington, on March 7, he testified before the House Public Lands Committee, saying that he was “very certain” that a greater degree of self-rule for the Pacific islands was desirable. Asked about General Douglas MacArthur’s position, he said, “In Tokyo the general told me that he was in accord with the policy of extending civilian administration and more self-rule to the islands.”2 It is interesting to note that this testimonial came on the very day that the proposed trusteeship agreement covering most of the islands of Micronesia was put before the Security Council, where the United States could exercise a veto, instead of the General Assembly, where issues would be decided by majority vote.
Opponents of the draft agreement had hoped Russia would raise its powerful voice, because through this document key islands scattered across 3,000,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean could be closed off to the world. In other words, an iron curtain could be drawn around them, enabling the United States to construct military installations there in secrecy anytime, anywhere, it pleased. That was certainly contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. Russia’s surprise approval of the proposed agreement late in February left both proponents and opponents scrambling for words. Neither side had much to say publicly. Even editorial comment was conspicuous by its absence. (p.70)
On March 3, 1947, four days before the Security Council was scheduled to vote on the proposal, Collier sent a letter to the New York Times. It was the first comment, either pro or con, to appear on the Times editorial page since the Russian position became known. In that letter Collier adamantly claimed that the proposed strategic trusteeship agreement, “faithless to the spirit of the Charter of United Nations, now has served an added sinister purpose, curiously unforeseen by ourselves.” Just as certain congressmen and Navy spokesmen had justified the draft agreement by reiterating that we had paid for those mandate islands “with our blood,” Collier continued, so Russia could argue that it had the right to unilaterally take under its wing other disputed regions of the world “paid for with Russian blood.”3
The letter began to wake policy makers up, but not soon enough. On March 7, when the Security Council met, it approved the proposed agreement with three minor amendments. Collier wrote in the March News Letter, “Russia’s surprise move [approval of the agreement] crystallized for the world what formerly had been clear to only a few specialized groups, that by proposing a virtual land-grabbing trusteeship agreement, America (p.71) inadvertently had shut her lips on her own voice.”4 No words could better express what we at the Institute felt.
Unknown by Collier or other Institute members at the time was a tacit understanding between Russia and the United States that the United States would acquiesce to Soviet retention of four Japanese islands in the southern Kuriles north of Japan in return for American control of Micronesia.5 This became clear to me only in 2005, when Robert F. Rogers, in a phone conversation, called my attention to page 206 of his book, Destiny’s Landing, where the secret accord was described. Also, not generally known at that time was the fact that the U.S. military wanted to use the isolated atolls of the Marshall Islands to test nuclear weapons. The first test, in fact, had been conducted on July 1, 1946, with an explosion on Bikini Island.
Truman’s placing of the Micronesian trusteeship under the Security Council instead of the General Assembly was a real blow to those of us who favored civilian administration of the islands. But the battle wasn’t over yet. In fact, it was far from over. President Truman had not yet announced which agency should administer those mandated, now trusteed, islands. He wouldn’t announce it for another two years. The outcome explains why I was able to call this book We Fought the Navy and Won. A victory with respect to civilian government was in the making, but there were many more ups and downs to come.
In the next Guam Echo, dated March 20, 1947, we were able to report that Interior Secretary Krug was now ready to give wholehearted support to civilian administration of Guam, Samoa, and the Japanese mandate islands. Testifying before the House Public Lands Committee on March 7, he had said:
I feel that the islands in the Pacific that are American-owned now and those that will be held under trusteeship arrangement should be accorded a form of civil government giving them national autonomy if possible. … It would be wise if we give them at least a separation between the courts and the law making and the law enforcement … [instead of] a single individual who, under a charter, makes the law, enforces the law, and decides whether he is doing it right. I think that is an intolerable situation.6
If the Guamanians were “fighting” for civil rights, and they were, some were doing it in a most genteel manner. While in Guam, Krug had been invited to the home of Agueda Johnston, a most knowledgeable and gracious host. We didn’t mention her by name in the March 20 Guam Echo, but we (p.72)
did write, “The Secretary of the Interior, who now has the distinction of being the only cabinet officer ever to have enjoyed the hospitality of a Guamanian home, has indeed become a ‘friend of Guam.’”7 Mrs. Johnston had helped win him over. I can’t help observing here, based on my future visits in the homes of people all over the world, how much more could be gained through this kind of diplomacy in contrast to what our political leaders often try to achieve through violent, military force.
Representative Norris Poulson (R., Calif.), Representative Clair Engle (D., Calif.), Delegate Joseph R. Farrington (R., Hawai‘i), several Army and Navy officers, and several Interior Department staff members, including Roy James and Carlton Skinner, who later became the first civilian governor of Guam, were members of the Krug delegation on that trip throughout the Pacific.
Upon their return to Washington, Representative Poulson told me for publication in the March 20, 1947, Guam Echo: “I propose to introduce an Organic Act for Guam which will give the people of Guam a measure of local self-government, American citizenship, a decent system of courts, (p.73) and a Resident Commissioner in Washington to look after their interests in the future. These long-suffering and loyal people deserve all we can do for them—and deserve it now!”8 Representative Engle said, for publication in the same Echo: “I found Guamanians to be intelligent, splendid people, capable of handling a wide degree of self-rule. They should have their own courts, their own legislature. This, I believe, is not inconsistent with United States defense purposes.”9
Most of a news article by Buck Buchwach that had appeared in The Honolulu Advertiser on February 27 was also reprinted in the March Guam Echo:
The towering head of the Interior Department strongly endorsed the substitution of civilian administration for military government of these islands and said he advocated such a change “soon.” He said such a change could be accomplished even in areas which the military has labeled strategic.
“There is no more strategic area in the Pacific than Hawaii, and you have civilian rule here,” he pointed out. … “There is no reason why many of the things now done by the navy [referring to transportation, communication, and medical facilities on Guam] can’t be continued. … The navy is doing an excellent job. That isn’t the question. … The question is whether those people are entitled to the same type of government that we are. I feel strongly that the basic principle of our government is civilian government for civilian people. That is why I am for statehood for Hawaii and civilian administration of Pacific islands.”10
In that Echo, we published the names of eight members added to the House Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Possessions (see Appendix 7). We also printed our first letter-to-the-editor. Signed simply “A Guamanian” to protect the writer from possible recriminations, it said in part: “The short visit made by the Secretary of Interior Krug and his party was most gratifying. It showed that at last an effort has been made to see the fire behind the smoke … While we are waiting for the result of these investigations, our feeling is like that of a person standing on one leg. When is the other one to be let down? We hope Congress will decide before we get too exhausted.”11
By this time, 143 Guamanians had joined the Institute, 54 of them in the previous two months. Encouraged by Collier and by all they were reading in the Institute publications, more and more Guamanians were beginning to speak out.
(p.74) Warned by us about the possible bias of the Hopkins Committee, the islanders were prepared when that high-powered trio appeared early in March. Shortly after their visit, a leading Guamanian wrote to the Institute, “The Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins Commission will be a success … if the Commission will recommend what they heard from the crowd that met them at the Guam Congress Hall. …” He went on to recount what the Guamanians had said. His rather long letter may be read in Appendix 8. We printed it in the March News Letter because it was important that readers know what Guamanians had told the Hopkins Commission. Collier wrote in response for publication in that News Letter: “If these views of the people are conscientiously reported and if recommendations as to legislation are based thereon, Secretary Forrestal will have what amounts to a mandate for civilian administration. The time to relieve Naval Civil Government officers of duty in Guam and Samoa then will have come.”12
Nearly three more years would pass, however, before Guam actually got its organic act. There would be many more political skirmishes before the die was cast. Sparks flew next on the Hill when Representative Poulson, in a speech before the House on March 31, 1947, charged Navy Secretary Forrestal with “deliberately withholding” from Congress all knowledge of the resolution passed by the Guam Congress three months before. Poulson also accused the Secretary of withholding from Congress the bill enacted in 1945 by the General Fono of American Samoa proposing an organic act for that island.13
This speech brought a sharp retort from Secretary Forrestal the very next day in the form of a letter addressed to Congressman Richard Welch, chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, on which Poulson also served. It was actually carried to Welch’s office by then Undersecretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, and various naval officers for introduction into the Congressional Record. No copy was furnished to Poulson.
In essence, the letter said that Secretary Forrestal understood such a bill had been passed by the Guam Congress on January 4, but no copy had been forwarded either to the governor of Guam or to Washington. Late in February, the Guam governor had directed his attorney general to prepare copies of the resolution, signed by the presiding officers of the Congress. The copies were not delivered to the governor until March 15, and still had not reached the Secretary of the Navy as of the date of the letter, April 1, 1947. In regard to the Samoan resolution, the Secretary said he understood it was embodied in the report of the Hopkins Committee, which would (p.75)
reach his desk sometime that week. The Secretary ended his letter, “Be assured that I have not deliberately withheld either of these matters from the Congress of the United States and immediately upon their receipt I shall transmit them expeditiously.”14
Congressman Poulson absolved the Secretary of any personal knowledge of the petitions in a speech to Congress on April 3, but made plain that
I am not withdrawing from the position I have taken in calling for an end to naval autocracy in Guam and American Samoa. … What is it that has aroused the Gold Braid Department of our Government and has prompted the Secretary of the Navy to have his letter placed in the Record of Congress? … The thing that brought out the hatchet men is the Poulson Bill, H.R. 2753. … The rub is, gentlemen, that by providing for a new form of government my bill in reality points out the evils of the existing form of government in Guam.15
(p.76) This exchange showed the congressman’s true mettle, as did the comments made by Harold L. Ickes in his syndicated newspaper column a few days later:
There can be no doubt that the Navy had knowledge of the action on January 4 of the Guamanian Congress. … The conclusion cannot be escaped that the Navy knew of these petitions and was desperately anxious to keep them from reaching the Congress, at least until the latest, hand-picked group, headed by Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, sent out by the Navy with whitewash buckets, could file its report defending the dictatorial naval rule of these two American possessions.16
I could only smile as I read again in 2005 Ickes’ words about the Navy’s “whitewash buckets.” How wonderfully forthright he could be! And how unabashed regarding stature or rank, even when dealing with the Secretary of the Navy and the retired president of Dartmouth University.
As part of the seesaw going on between proponents of civilian government and advocates of continued naval administration, Representative Poulson had introduced H.R. 2753 on March 24, 1947, scarcely three weeks after his trip through the Pacific with Interior Secretary Krug. It proposed U.S. citizenship and an organic act for the people of Guam. On April 9, an identical bill, S. 1078, was introduced by Hugh A. Butler (R., Nebr.) in the Senate.
News of these bills was conveyed to the Guam people in the sixth issue of the Guam Echo, dated April 14, 1947. Poulson told us that his office had forwarded copies of his bill to leading members of the Guam Congress. But knowing that not many Guamanians would be able to lay their hands on it that way, we spelled out for our readers the main provisions, as listed below. Incidentally, nearly all provisions were included in the final bill that the White House instructed the Interior Department to write two years later. If enacted, the Poulson and Butler bills would:
1. Transfer administration of Guam from the Navy Department to the Interior Department;
2. Place the reins of administration in the hands of a civilian governor appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate;
3. Set up a two-house legislature to enact laws, modeled upon the Guam Congress, members to be paid $15 each day Congress was in session plus travel expenses for one round-trip each session;
(p.77) 4. Provide for a Resident Commissioner in the U.S. House of Representatives, elected by the people of Guam;
5. Establish a District Court of Guam with the right of appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court;
6. Extend the power of local taxation to the Guam Congress;
7. Establish private commercial banking facilities in place of the naval-owned and -operated Bank of Guam;
8. Enforce equal pay for equal work in Guam;
9. Extend to Guam U.S. Public Health Service, the National School Lunch Act, vocational education aids, soil conservation, and other social and economic services.
Washington observers familiar with all bills on this subject agreed that the Butler and Poulson bills seemed to meet most adequately the needs expressed by Guamanians. Both bills provided a framework for good government and left the details to be worked out by the Guam Congress and other officials. The “miscellaneous provisions” extending social and economic services to the islanders were not carried in any other bill.17
As it happened, the Hopkins Committee report, an eighty-page document, was filed with Secretary Forrestal on March 25, the day after the Poulson and Butler bills were introduced. The report was not released to the press until May 11, 1947.
Basic recommendations of the committee were threefold: (1) that the people of Guam and American Samoa be made United States citizens as soon as possible, (2) that the future government of both American possessions be under an organic act, and (3) that general control over the islands be retained in the Navy Department for the immediate, though undefined, future. Writing for the May 1947 issue of the Institute News Letter, Collier stated: “In making public the report, Secretary Forrestal announced his concurrence in the recommendations for citizenship and an organic act. If enacted by Congress these represent the longest strides toward democracy taken in the history of American control of the islands.”18
Paradoxically, Collier continued, the major factual part of the report substantiated the points used by critics of naval administration as arguments for an immediate change to civilian government. Yet the Hopkins Committee had not been able to go that far in their recommendations. In fact, what they wrote flew in the face of what the Guamanians had told them. The report stated: “Nowhere did your committee find any expression (p.78)
of desire to be removed from under the auspices of the Navy, but on the contrary, whenever discussion of the matter came up, apprehension was expressed as to whether from any other department than the Navy, service so vital to them as these in their possession could be afforded.”19
This ran counter to the anonymous letter from a leading Guamanian printed in our March 1947 News Letter (see Appendix 8), and everybody concerned knew it. The Hopkins Committee had chosen to ignore the fact that the Interior Department for many years had administered far-flung Hawai‘i, Alaska, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. It also chose to ignore Interior Secretary Krug’s statements, given nationwide publicity at the end of his inspection trip, urging that the islands be placed under civilian rule immediately. A solemn mood had settled over all of us at the Institute, which contributed to the title on Collier’s analytical article in the May 1947 News Letter, “Time Only Can Tell. …” It ended with the following conclusion, “The Hopkins Committee has thrown its weight, if not its facts or argument, behind continuation of naval rule, (p.79) while suggesting that at some indefinite future date, under an organic act, some new, presumptively civilian, agency should replace the Navy.”20
It was always amazing to me that Collier could lay his hands on government reports so quickly and analyze them so promptly. He had the mind of a prosecuting attorney, though he had never studied law. Because we thought our readers would be interested in many aspects of the Hopkins Report, we devoted the entire May issue of the Guam Echo to direct quotations that provided a summary of each section. With Collier’s help, we were able to publish that Echo only four days after the eighty-page report became available. We noted that a fuller analysis was in the May issue of the Institute News Letter and that copies of the full report were available in the office of Guam governor Pownall.21
Congressional committees in charge of island affairs spent most of the month of May digesting the Krug and Hopkins reports. But by May 27, 1947, the House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs was ready to hold the first of several hearings on pending bills. A blue-ribbon panel had been invited to appear. The first day would feature Representative Robert A. Grant, sponsor of H.R. 3044; Senator Hugh A. Butler, sponsor of S. 1078; and John Wiig, Honolulu attorney who was chief of police in military government on Guam during the war—all friendly witnesses. On the second day, Interior Secretary Julius A. Krug would lead off, followed by Navy Under Secretary John L. Sullivan; Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring; Representative Willis W. Bradley, Jr., former naval governor of Guam; Maurice J. Tobin, member of the Hopkins Committee; Richard H. Wels, a New York attorney who had served with the Navy on Guam during the war; and our own Dr. Laura Thompson, author of Guam and Its People. Finally, on June 2, Former Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes would appear with Secretary Hilldring, taking the stand again (see Appendix 9).
Before the morning of the first day had passed, it was clear that citizenship and organic law were no longer at issue. Everyone agreed that these rights had been too long denied and that any bill for the islands should embody these principles. In a surprise move on the second day of the hearings, the Navy, Interior, State and War Departments made a joint statement favoring government by civilians “at the earliest practicable moment.”22 The four departments must finally have met and come to an agreement! But what kind of agreement? Civilian government? Yes. They said it out loud, before a congressional committee. Fantastic! But, “at the earliest practicable moment.” What did that mean? Therein lay the problem. In (p.80) their joint statement and the bill accompanying it, the four departments had recommended that “the timing of the transfer and the designation of the agency to which the transfer is made be delegated to the President …” (italics mine).23 So the four department secretaries had passed the buck to the president. And what did they think he would do about the timing? When questioned by the subcommittee, Navy Under Secretary Sullivan estimated that this changeover could come within five or ten years. Interior Secretary Krug said he thought it could be accomplished sooner, but he refused to mention a specific time.
Krug repeatedly was called inconsistent for the stand he was taking on delayed civilian administration. Newspaper clippings dated late in February, when Krug was returning from his swing through the Pacific, were called to his attention by the congressmen. In these clippings, he was quoted as favoring a change to civilian administration “soon.”
Republican Congressman Poulson accused Krug of “compromising his principles” by going along with the Navy Department in order to make a show of unity within the Democratic administration. He said, “The Navy Department is the winner and Interior Department the loser in this compromise. For by your joint bill, the Navy is left in control, and nothing in it compels the President or Congress to place jurisdiction in any other Department ever.”24
Poulson continued by chiding all the department heads, stating that although their joint statement stated that they favored civilian rule, the bill they submitted failed ever to use the term “civilian.” At the end of a year, or five or ten years, he said, the president could name the Navy as the designated administrator. Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring said the State Department “likes this bill because it envisages early turnover to a civilian agency.” To this, Poulson sharply replied, “We go by what is in the law, not by what departments say they mean.”25
Tobin of the Hopkins Committee and Congressman Willis Bradley urged that the transfer of jurisdiction be postponed for months or even years. They argued that the effectiveness of reconstructing war-torn Guam would be impaired if the changeover were made “now.” When pressed to explain in just what way reconstruction would be impaired, Under Secretary Sullivan said, “The Navy is making an effort to adjudicate those [war] claims as quickly as possible. We have a team of experts out there now. To transfer the job to Interior Department would delay payment of claims.”26
(p.81) Ickes challenged the efficiency of the Navy. He promptly observed that at the rate the Navy Claims Commission was going, according to figures in the Hopkins Report, settlement would not be completed for twenty years. The report said about 420 cases had been settled or processed to Washington by March 1947, fifteen months after the Navy Claims Commission was authorized, leaving more than 6,300 claims to go. He pointed to the Federal Security Agency and the Interior Department as two civilian agencies fully experienced in the problems of reconstruction that could efficiently take up wherever the Navy left off.
Laura Thompson called the Navy’s refusal to lend money on the basis of claims indicative of a “lack of confidence which the naval government itself has in its own ability or intention to settle such claims in the near future.” She pointed to the impracticability of the naval government’s elaborate plan for the rebuilding of Agana, “which to this day remains a grass patch.” She also noted that the cost of Guam’s naval government—$88 per capita—was higher than the cost of any state in the union.27
The third edition of Guam and Its People by Thompson was just off the press in Hawai‘i and was made available to members of the subcommittee. In the May issue of the Institute News Letter, it was described by a reviewer as “the authoritative book on the Chamorros, their extraordinary history, their almost unexampled capacity for adjustment and survival, assimilation and adjustment; with a factual, dispassionate examination of naval rule from 1899 to the present.”28
Immediate transferal of jurisdiction was urged by Representative Grant, Senator Butler, Richard Wels of New York, and John Wiig of Honolulu.
In the final questioning of Secretary Hilldring on the third day of the hearings, shortly before the subcommittee adjourned, it seemed clear that members of the House were trying to pin the departments down on a reasonable date for the transfer and write it into the bill, along with a stipulation that the Department of the Interior should be the civilian agency to which authority would be transferred. Representative William Lemke, Republican subcommittee member from North Dakota, told Hilldring, “the more you testify, the more I am convinced that Guam and Samoa should be given civilian administration immediately.”29 Representative Fred Crawford seemed to sum up the sentiment of all members of the subcommittee when he said to spokesmen of the four departments, “You have a long way to go to convince me that civilian administration should not be instituted now.”30
(p.82) If legislation could go forward, we editorialized two days later in the June 4, 1947, Guam Echo, the ultimate decisions would no longer rest with the president. Interior would be written into the bill as the administering agency and a date for the transfer of jurisdiction would be named by Congress. We speculated that a new bill could be written before Congress adjourned at the end of July and that it could be enacted early in the next session of Congress.
An editorial from the Honolulu Star Bulletin, dated May 13, 1947, and reprinted in the June 4 Guam Echo proved prophetic. It noted that the Hopkins Committee report was not conclusive, and that Congress itself should visit the Pacific islands. On the first day of the House hearings, May 27, Richard Wels had strongly suggested that a party of Guamanians selected by the Guam Congress be transported by the Navy to Washington to testify. Under Secretary Sullivan had responded that the Navy had no objection, provided an exact time could be set and expenses could be met. The subcommittee voted to go into executive session on the subject.31
The very next day, I phoned Representative Crawford, chairman of the subcommittee, to see what he thought about the proposal so I could write it into the June 4 Echo. He said plans for bringing Guamanians to Washington could not be completed before a couple of weeks, implying that a second hearing on the bills would have to be scheduled. Passage of legislation would then be delayed. On the third day of the hearings, June 2, he had commented publicly that, as far as he was concerned, it was not necessary to bring Guamanians in to testify. He said he was convinced that they wanted citizenship, an organic act, and civilian rule. Over the phone, he repeated that they should get them “now.”
Guam was at that point within a whisker of getting the changes its people wanted. But on June 18, 1947, at an executive session of the subcommittee, instead of reporting out an existing bill, members voted to go to the islands and see for themselves what the Navy, War, State, and Interior Departments had been unable to agree on. A vote on any bill would be postponed until after that. Tentative plans were made for the delegation to leave soon after Congress recessed in July. A new bill would be prepared for presentation the following January.
How could the Institute object to that? Collier had always been supportive of a congressional investigation, so the proposed trip could only be considered a bump in the road to civilian government. There was no way around it. What might have been a quick fix for the islands through (p.83) almost perfect legislation then pending became a postponed dream for Congressman Crawford and the Guamanians. To my mind, the subcommittee’s decision reflected the prospect of a pleasant summer junket to the tropics for certain congressmen—but of course I knew better than to say so. We would just have to wait out another investigation. In some ways, the Navy had won another round. It had achieved the inaction of the 80th Congress that it had hoped for.
(1.) “Civilian Administration: ‘The Next Step,’” News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, March 1947, 6.
(3.) John Collier letter to the New York Times, dated March 3, 1947; reprinted in the News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, March 1947, 4.
(5.) Robert F. Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press), 206–207.
(6.) “Secretary Krug: ‘A Friend of Guam,’” Guam Echo, March 20, 1947, 1.
(11.) “Letter-to-the-Editor,” Guam Echo, March 20, 1947, 4.
(12.) “Civilian Administration: ‘The Next Step,’” News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, March 1946, 7.
(13.) “Forrestal and Poulson Clash over Guam Resolution,” Guam Echo, April 15, 1947, 1.
(16.) Syndicated “Man to Man” column, Harold L. Ickes, April 9, 1947.
(17.) “New Bills for Guam,” Guam Echo, April 15, 1947, 4.
(18.) “The Hopkins Report,” Guam Echo, May 15, 1947, 1.
(20.) “Time Only Can Tell …,” News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, May 1947, 5–8.
(21.) “Navy Department Receives Hopkins Committee Recommendations: Supports U.S. Citizenship and Organic Act for Guam and American Samoa,” Guam Echo, May 15, 1947, 1–5.
(22.) “House Committee Holds Hearings on Guam Bills,” Guam Echo, June 4, 1947, 1.